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Chalk: Materials and Concepts in Mathematics
Research
Michael J. Barany∗ Donald MacKenzie†
Preprint, August, 2011
1 Chalk in Hand
Chalk in hand, his formulas expressed themselves, it seems, more
easily on the board than they were able to with pen in his note-
books, for in his listeners’ presence his fecund genius found again
a new zeal, and a ray of joy illuminated the lines of his face when
the proof he sought to render understandable struck his audience
with obviousness.1
So recounts an admiring biographer the pedagogical exploits of Augustin-
Louis Cauchy, a towering figure of early nineteenth-century mathematics.
Cauchy was trained and then taught at the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique,
a school for military engineers that not long before Cauchy’s matriculation
became one of the first to make systematic use of a new mode of advanced
mathematical instruction: lessons at a blackboard. Today, chalk and black-
boards are ubiquitous in mathematics education and research. Chalk figures
prominently in the imaginations and daily routines of most mathematicians.
∗Corresponding author (mbarany@princeton.edu). Princeton University, Program in
History of Science. Barany’s work was supported by a Marshall Scholarship and a National
Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (Grant No. DGE-0646086).
†University of Edinburgh, School of Social and Political Science.
1Valson 1868, 1:253, our translation from the French original.
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For Cauchy’s biographer, there was an organic link between chalk, genius,
audiences, mathematical proof, obviousness, and understanding. This link
persists to this day. There is, we contend, an essential relationship between
the supposedly abstract concepts and methods of advanced mathematics and
the material substituents and practices that constitute them. This process
operates even in the rarefied realm of mathematical research, where the pre-
tense of dealing purely in abstract, ideal, logical entities does not liberate
mathematicians from their dependence on materially circumscribed forms of
representation. That this self-effacing materiality is often unnoticed (unlike
the visible and controversial materiality of computerized mathematical proof
analyzed by MacKenzie 2001) makes the case of research mathematics all
the more important to the social study of theoretical representations. In-
deed, the very appearance of scholarly mathematics as a realm apart is a
social achievement of practices that produce mathematical ideas using ma-
terial surrogates.
This chapter reports a series of ethnographic findings centered on the
theme of chalk and blackboards as a way of illustrating the distinctive modes
of inscription underlying mathematical research. Chalk, here, functions both
as a metaphor and as a literal device in the construction and circulation of
new concepts. We begin, after a brief review of extant literature, by describ-
ing the quotidian contexts of such work. We then explore the blackboard as
a site of mathematical practice before finally expanding on its metaphorical
and allusive significance in other forms of research.
Our observations have a dual character. On the one hand, we describe
the supposedly distinctive realm of mathematics in a way that should ap-
pear consonant with other scholarly disciplines that one might imagine to be
rather different from it. Observations that would be “old news” about other
sciences or unsurprising to those acquainted with mathematical practice are
nevertheless significant in a context where so few investigations of the sort
we report here have been undertaken. On the other hand, we aim to account
in some small way for the distinctiveness of mathematics, both as a field of
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study with its own characteristic objects and practices and as a domain that
succeeds in appearing far more distinctive than we would suggest is the case.
In our account, the formal rigor at the heart of mathematical order be-
comes indissociable from the “chalk in hand” character of routine mathe-
matical work. We call attention to the vast labor of decoding, translating,
and transmaterializing official texts without which advanced mathematics
could not proceed. More than that, we suggest that these putatively passive
substrates of mathematical knowledge and practice instead embody constant
pressures and constraints that shape mathematical research in innumerable
ways.
2 Prior Accounts
This conclusion, developed through Barany’s recent ethnographic study of
university mathematics researchers,2 builds on related literatures in the soci-
ology and history of logic and the natural sciences, the history of mathemat-
ics, and the sociology of settled mathematics. Closest in methods and analyt-
ical orientation is a range of historical and ethnographic accounts of univer-
sity researchers in ‘thinking sciences’ such as theoretical physics,3 artificial
intelligence,4 and symbolic logic.5 These accounts collectively demonstrate
how intersubjective resources are mobilized and disputed in the production
of abstract accounts of physical, social, or logical entities. Their concern
for the connection between theories and their means of articulation draws
from early laboratory studies that documented the artifactual achievement
of circulable data and principles of scientific knowledge through the use of
2For a full account of the study’s methods and findings, see Barany 2010. Barany
observed the weekly seminar and conducted a series of interviews exploring the everyday
research practices and diachronic research developments of a group of early- and mid-career
mathematicians studying partial differential equations and related topics at a major British
research university.
3Of particular note are Ochs et al. 1994, 1996, and 1997, Galison 1997, Merz and Knorr
Cetina 1997, and Kaiser 2005.
4Suchman 1990 and Suchman and Trigg 1993.
5See Rosental 2004, 2008, and Greiffenhagen 2008.
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instruments and other means of “inscription” or “rendering” that tame and
transform specimens of nature.6
Two bodies of scholarship help us to adapt the foregoing insights to math-
ematics. Historians and some empirically-minded philosophers have traced
the elaboration of specific mathematical theories and techniques using a va-
riety of frameworks.7 Sociologists, meanwhile, have described mathematical
pedagogy at many levels,8 elementary proofs and examples,9 and (less of-
ten) advanced theorems,10 detailing in each case the modes and means of
intelligibility for already-established mathematical ideas. Some take an ex-
plicitly cognitive approach11 and stress the mental and corporeal structures
that ground mathematical thinking.
Most users of advanced mathematics, and indeed most mathematicians
themselves, spend most of their time dealing with settled mathematics. This
is the mathematics of teaching and of many forms of problem solving, even
when these require deploying accepted results and methods in new ways, and
it has generally proven amenable to social and historical analysis. Due to the
obfuscations of temporal distance and conceptual difficulty, however, histori-
ans and sociologists of mathematics have struggled to account for the ongoing
achievement of original knowledge in a research context, such as has been
ventured for laboratory sciences. At present, those wishing to understand
the core activity in most mathematicians’ aspirations and self-identity must
rely on accounts by mathematicians themselves or philosophically-oriented
treatises on the subject.12 While we cannot pretend to fill this lacuna, our
6Woolgar 1982 offers an early assessment of the literature; Lynch 1985 and Latour
and Woolgar 1986 are two influential examples, treating “rendering” and “inscription”
respectively; see also Lynch 1990 on the mathematical ordering of nature and Woolgar
1990 on documents in scientific practice.
7For example, Lakatos 1979, Bloor 1973, 1976, 1978, Mehrtens 1990, Pickering 1995,
Netz 1999, Jesseph 1999, and Warwick 2003.
8Lave 1988, Kirshner and Whitson 1997, Greiffenhagen and Sharrock 2005.
9Livingston 1999, Bloor 1976, Rotman 1988, 1993, 1997.
10Livingston 1986, MacKenzie 2001.
11E.g. Netz 1999, Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez 2000. See also Hutchins 1995, Mialet 1999.
12Prominent ones include DeMillo, Lipton, and Perlis 1979, Davis and Hersh 1981, and
Thurston 1994; see also Heintz 2000 and Aschbacher 2005.
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study offers a model for how such an account might proceed.
3 Mathematics in Action
On Mondays during term, members of the Analysis Group return from lunch
and assemble to hear a local or invited colleague’s hour-long presentation on
the fruits and conundrums of his or her13 recent and ongoing scholarship.
These lectures are marked by a shared specialized vocabulary and expertise
and sometimes-spirited outbursts of discussion over technical details. One
gets the impression, however, that the specific mathematics of the presenta-
tion is of at best marginal interest to most of the gathered audience. Some
jot notes or furrow their brows, but one is just as likely to see someone nod-
ding off to sleep as nodding in agreement. Most audience members regard
the speaker with a brand of reserved attentiveness that is easily mistaken for
comprehension.
Lurking in the seminar’s subtext and between the lines of multiple inter-
views was the open secret that mathematicians—even those in the same field,
working on the same topics, or veterans of multiple mutual collaborations—
tend to have comparatively little idea of what each other does.14 Mathemat-
ics is a staggeringly fragmented discipline whose practitioners must master
the art of communicating without co-understanding. Indeed, mathematicians
seem persistently preoccupied with sharing their work with each other, boldly
blinding themselves to the petty incomensurabilities of their studies in order
to join, on scales ranging from meetings with collaborators to international
congresses, in mutual mathematical activity.
Seminar performances are conditioned on a form of understanding whose
pervasive presence and role in mathematical education and research stands in
stark contrast to its minor role in extant accounts of mathematical proof and
13Though women occasionally were present at the Analysis Seminar, all of the speakers
during the period of Barany’s study were men.
14Thurston (1994, 165 et passim) notes something similar, and Merz and Knorr Cetina
(1997, 74) identify a comparable phenomenon in theoretical physics.
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cognition. Most in the seminar audience do not aim for a detailed working
knowledge of the results being presented—this can take years to acquire
(after which the talk would not have much to offer)—but rather comprehend
the talk in the sense of following the argument, engaging with the talk’s
conceptual narrative and technical and heuristic manipulations.
This “following” mode is reflected in how both speakers and participants
prepare for the seminar. Which is to say, in large part, how they do not
prepare. Audience-members do not typically study for upcoming talks by
looking into the speaker’s topic or previous work. Seminar-goers are easily
bored and prone to distraction, said one informant, adding that they rarely
care in any event about the details behind the speaker’s findings. Speakers
indicated that their preparations, depending on the formality and importance
of the occasion, ranged from “exactly four minutes” (an underestimate, but
not a wholly misleading one) to a week of sporadic effort. For a chalk lecture,
a single draft of highly-condensed notes suffices.
Nearly all of the speaker’s words and a varying but typically large portion
of what is written on the blackboard during a seminar are produced extem-
poraneously. Speakers are expected to produce written and oral expositions
with limited reference to notes, which serve primarily to help the speaker
to recall precise formulations of nuanced or complex theorems or definitions.
One result of the speaker’s lack of premeditation regarding inscriptions is the
frequent need to adjust notations mid-lecture—notations which do not nec-
essarily correspond to the ones used in the limited paper notes the speaker
had prepared.
Talks are not, of course, pulled from thin air. Rather, they rely on mathe-
maticians’ skill, honed through years of teaching, presenting, and interacting
with colleagues, of constructing an argument at the board from a collec-
tion of principles and conventions. These arguments are built out of shared
rhetorical scripts and graphical representations, practiced over many years
and in many settings, that govern how commonly-used ideas and methods
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are described and inscribed in mathematical discourse.15 Those conventions
also connect chalk-writing to speaking, so that those who make a record of
the talk tend only to transcribe text from the board, making comparatively
few notes from the spoken component of the presentation.
Seminars are thus conditioned on a great deal of shared training in discur-
sive and conceptual norms. Typically, however, the speaker’s and audience’s
expertise and interests align only superficially. As one speaker put it: “it’s
not clear that there’s anything in the intersection of what this person’s think-
ing of and what I know how to do.” But the seminar is far from pointless.
“It’s a bit like a beehive,” the same speaker volunteered a few days before his
talk: “Collecting nectar and pollen doesn’t benefit the specific bee so well,
but it’s important for the community.”
Indeed, seminar attendance is among the chief manifestations of the
Analysis Group as a community. During the lecture, speakers constitute
other communities as well by framing their research in terms of recogniz-
able problems and approaches. These larger communities, organized around
particular expertise, structure the kinds of reasoning that can be impli-
cated in a seminar’s “following” activity. Researchers develop expectations
about arguments, so that, as one explained, “If the argument is sort of well-
established,. . . it can be the case that people know where it’s going to break if
it’s going to break.” Specialisms also supply canonical terms and arguments,
dictating what claims can be made (and how) without further justification.
Specialism-specific ways of describing objects and rendering them on
blackboards and other media are enculturated through attending and pre-
senting lectures: “you somehow learn how to talk,” explained an experienced
speaker. Seminar presenters pepper their talks with remarks about “what
everybody calls” certain objects or citations of “some standard assumptions”
and note standard approaches even when not using them. Speakers cite his-
15In this sense, the mathematical seminar offers an alternative mode of lecturing to the
classical typology of lecturing proposed by Goffman (1981), featuring a form of “fresh
talk” that is neither presented nor understood as spontaneous but is simultaneously quite
distinct from memorized or strictly rehearsed lecture talk.
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torical authorities in relevant subject areas and refer to colleagues (including
some present at the seminar) to personalize these allusions. These references
to people and concepts work to dissolve temporal as well as professional
boundaries. In an interview, one junior researcher spoke undifferentiatedly
of insights from a senior colleague gleaned, respectively, from a conversation
the previous week and a body of that colleague’s work more than two decades
old. So, too, do old and new theorems and approaches coexist in a seamless
technical matrix on the seminar blackboard, thereby enacting an epistemol-
ogy of mathematics that actively looks past concepts’ context-specificities.
Like the neuroscientists studied by Lynch (1985), subjects for this study
organized and narrativized their research activity according to various projects.16
Subjects typically maintained three active projects concurrently, often with
many more investigations “on the shelf.” Projects were distinguished by their
set of collaborators, their animating questions, and the “tools” or methods
they employed. Their progress was marked in researchers’ minds by the
gradual reification and conquest or circumvention of barriers they classified
as conceptual or (less often) technical. Projects rarely end decisively, but can
be disrupted by the relocation of a collaborator, stymied or made obsolete by
other researchers’ results, or stalled before particularly stark conceptual bar-
riers. When a suitable partial result is obtained and researchers are confident
in the theoretical soundness of their work, they transition to “writing up”.
Only then do most of the formalisms associated with official mathematics
emerge, often with frustrating difficulty. Every researcher interviewed had
stories about conclusions that had either come apart in the attempt to for-
malize them or been found in error even after the paper had been drafted,
submitted, or accepted. Most see writing-up as a process of verification as
much as of presentation, even though the mathematical effort of writing-up
is viewed as predominantly “technical,” and thus implicitly not an obstacle
16The project-orientation of labor and narrative seems quite natural for neuroscientific
research, with its vast assemblages of researchers, technicians, and apparatus. Given the
stereotype of the lone mathematician and the importance of breakthrough stories in post-
facto accounts of mathematical innovation, however, the predominance of project-work in
mathematics is considerably more surprising.
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to the result’s ultimate correctness or insightfulness.
Seminars have a special place in the temporal organization of mathematics
research. For presenters, presentations can drive the writing-up process by
forcing the speaker to cast recent results in a narrative that can be used
in both talks and papers, one that mobilizes both program and project to
construct an intelligible account of their work (cf. Ochs and Jacoby 1997).
Preparing a piece of work for public consumption requires the impartition of
an explanatory public logic where ideas develop according to concrete and
recognizable methods. Seminars force researchers to articulate their thinking
in terms of a series of significant steps, unavoidably changing the thinking in
the process by forcing it to conform to a publicly viable model or heuristic.
Finally, the seminar’s audience joins in the constitution of a shared public
logic that frames their own projects in turn.
Thus, the “following” that takes place in the seminar and extends to
other areas of mathematical communication consists of more than the mere
sequential comprehension of inscriptions and allusions. “Following” struc-
tures the production and intelligibility of entire programs of mathematical
research, as well as of the communities that engage in those programs. These
entities are built along figures of time and topic that underwrite the directed
pursuit of new mathematics.
4 An Ostentatious Medium
We have just depicted a seminar room subtly suffused with concepts and
allusions, but these invisible entities are largely just a facile shorthand for
what takes place in the seminar. Rather than as a trading zone for airy
intellections, we aim to treat mathematical communication in terms of the
pointings, tappings, rubbings, and writings that more manifestly pervade our
subjects’ work.17 In the seminar, these materializations of mathematics are
17The observations in this section should be compared to Ochs, Jacoby, and Gonzales’s
(1994) discourse analysis of physicists’ use of “graphic space” to narrate their work and
to Suchman and Trigg’s (1993) analysis of whiteboard work among artificial intelligence
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concentrated around the person of the speaker and the physicality of the
blackboard.
There is nothing about the blackboard that is strictly necessary to the
mathematician. There are other means of writing equations for personal or
public display, other tokens on which to hang one’s disciplinary hat. Outside
of the seminar room, blackboards play a relatively limited (which is not to
say insignificant) role in most mathematicians’ daily work. The stereotype of
the chalk-encrusted mathematician is nearly as mis-begotten as that of the
mathematician lost in his own mental world.
Nevertheless, mathematicians return to the blackboard. Introduced in
its present form as a large surface for pedagogic chalk writing near the turn
of the nineteenth century, its status as an iconic signifier for the discipline
is no accident.18 Blackboards dominate mathematics in two crucial spheres:
the classroom and the seminar. It is with blackboards that young mathe-
maticians learn the ins and outs of their art, and it is on blackboards that
established scholars publicly ply their newly-minted innovations. These twin
settings enshrine blackboard mathematics as exemplary in a way that per-
vades all of mathematical practice—whether marked in dust, ink, or electrical
circuits—despite the blackboard’s ever-growing appearance of obsolescence.19
It matters little that the full measure of the blackboard’s glory is confined
to the narrow environs that lend it its profound influence. In the pregnant
space between chalk and slate there reposes a germ of the bursts of inspira-
tion, triumphs of logic, and leaps of intuition that dominate mind-centered
researchers.
18We can only note here that blackboards’ iconicity is vast. They are ubiquitous props
in portraits of theoretical researchers in mathematics and physics—on which, see Barthes
(1957, 104–105)—and a widely traded symbol of pedagogic authority and intellectual
inspiration, from Good Will Hunting to Glenn Beck. On the nineteenth-century pedagogic
history of the blackboard, see Kidwell et al (2008) and Wylie (2011).
19We do not have the space for a systematic discussion of competing technologies to
chalk and blackboards, which include alternative writing surfaces as well as tools for
projecting text and images. See, however, Barany’s (2010, 43–44 et passim) discussion of
these technologies with reference to adaptations that reinforce the disciplinary centrality
of the blackboard even when it is not in use.
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accounts of mathematics.20
As components of the mathematics department’s physical infrastructure,
blackboards are most prominent in seminar rooms and lecture theaters.
There, multiple boards are typically arranged to span the front of the room,
sometimes in sliding columns that allow the speaker to move the boards up
or down for writing and display (figure 1). Blackboards are also found in the
tea room used by faculty and graduate students and in individual professors’
and shared student offices.
Figure 1: An arrangement of sliding blackboards from the Analysis Group’s
seminar room.
Even as blank slates, blackboards are laden with meaning. As topical sur-
faces of potential inscription, they define the spatial outlay of lectures and
tutorials, guiding audience members in their choice of seats and occasionally
demanding that the room be reconfigured to improve the board’s visibility.21
They presage the seminar’s rhythm, its steady alternation of marking, talk-
20It should be said that blackboards have been made predominantly out of materials
other than slate for most of their history. The paradigmatic relationship between black-
board and slate has, however, fundamentally shaped blackboards’ social meaning and
material development. Nor, for that matter, are blackboards always black. The seminar
boards at the heart of this study were a dark shade of green.
21Suchman (1990, 315) notes a related phenomenon of whiteboards orienting researchers
in a shared interactional space in the more intimate settings of research discussions—a
phenomenon we also noted among the mathematicians in our study.
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ing, moving, and erasing. They are perpetually at hand: even in conference
talks, whose frenetic pace tends to preclude blackboard exposition, they are
occasionally mobilized to expand on a point missing from a speaker’s pre-
pared slides; in the tea room, conceptual discussions sometimes find their
way to the room’s otherwise rarely-used boards; in offices, boards serve as
notepads for non-mathematical ephemera (such as telephone numbers) in
addition to mathematical jottings.
More features appear when blackboards are in use. They are big and
available: large expanses of board are visible and markable at each point in
a presentation, and even the comparatively small boards in researcher offices
are valued for their relative girth. Blackboards are common and co-present—
users see blackboard marks in largely the same way at the same time. They
are slow and loud: the deliberate tapping and sliding of blackboard writing
forces the sequential coordination of depiction and explanation at the board,
pacing and focusing speaker and audience alike. They are robust and reliable.
And, as noted above, they are ostentatious—so much so that colleagues in
shared offices expressed shyness about doing board work when office-mates
are present.
As a semiotic technology, the blackboard is as much a stage as a writing
surface. That is, boards constitute spaces for mathematical performances
that are not reducible to the speaker’s chalk writing. Speakers frequently
dramatized particular mathematical phenomena, using the board as a prop,
setting, or backdrop.22 Most seminar gestures, however, index rather than
indicate mathematical phenomena, exploiting the spatial configuration of the
blackboard to organize concepts and settings. That is, rather than indicate
22Greiffenhagen (2008, par. 29–66) and Greiffenhagen and Sharrock (2005) make com-
parable observations for logic instruction. Nu´n˜ez (2008) offers a contrasting approach to
gestures in mathematical performance, seeking fundamental cognitive mechanisms under-
lying gestures and metaphors used in mathematics. We thank an anonymous referee for
pointing out that these gestures, which are either audience-facing or board-facing, take
place in a lecture context where nearly all writing is done while the speaker faces away from
the audience. Thus, the physical constraints of the board provide a stage that markedly
limits the timing and orientation of the gestures available to the speaker at any given point
of the lecture.
12
particular phenomena, the vast majority of observed gestures indicated those
phenomena’s place in the foregoing exposition—indexing place rather than
indicating properties.23 Proofs are explained with reference to their initial
assumptions by pointing at or tapping boards filled with lists of conditions,
which are typically placed at the tops of boards even when space remains at
the bottom of the board at which the speaker had been writing.
When an argument is invoked for the second time in a lecture, the
speaker’s hand can trace its earlier manifestation from top to bottom as
a substitute for re-reading or re-writing it. A question from the audience
frequently prompts the speaker to return a previously-worked sliding board
to its position at the time of its working in order to answer queries about the
writing thereon, even if no additional marks are made. It is not uncommon
to see the speaker’s eyes casting about the board for an earlier statement
before deciding how to proceed with the next. On multiple occasions, the
speaker gestured at a particular statement’s former place on the board even
after it had been erased, rather than reproduce the statement in another part
of the board for the purpose of referring to it.
Specific board locations can carry mathematical significance. Parts of
an expression can be separated visually, and corresponding terms are often
aligned or written over each other, even when this requires the writer to
sacrifice some of the marks’ legibility. For instance, when a new bound
is introduced for an analytic expression many speakers simply erased the
bounded expression and contorted their writing so that the new bound would
fit in its place. Similarly, when a proof hinged on the proper grouping or re-
grouping of terms in an expression speakers exaggerated the physical spacing
between certain terms when writing them. Thus spatialized, statements can
be mobilized or demobilized by emphatic or obfuscatory gestures. Multiple
speakers, for example, mimed erasing an expression or simply blocked it with
23In particular, this observation contrasts with the emphases of Greiffenhagen (2008) and
Greiffenhagen and Sharrock (2005). Even in research settings, we found board positioning
to be a significant but easily-overlooked instrumental feature of board inscriptions, an
observation consonant with Suchman (1990, 315–316).
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their hands in order temporarily to exclude it from a consideration or to show
that an explanation strategically ignores it.
And what of the marks themselves? One rarely thinks of what cannot be
written with chalk, a tool that promises the ability to add and remove marks
from a board almost at will. The chalk’s shape, its lack of a sharp point, and
the angle and force with which it must be applied to make an impression, all
conspire to make certain kinds of writing impossible or impractical. Small
characters and minute details prove difficult, and it is hard to differentiate
fonts in chalk text. Board-users thus resort to large (sometimes abbreviated)
marks, borrow typewriter conventions such as underlining or overlining, or
employ board-specific notations such as “blackboard bold” characters (e.g. Z,
R, and C) to denote specific classes of mathematical objects.
Not every trouble has a work-around. Similar to a ball-point pen or pencil
on paper, chalk must be dragged along the board’s surface to leave a trace.
Entrenched mathematical conventions from the era of fountain pens, such as
“dotting” a letter to indicate a function’s derivative, stymie even experienced
lecturers by forcing them to choose between a recognizable dotting gesture
and the comparatively cumbersome strokes necessary to leave a visible dot
on the board.
The consequences of chalk for mathematics are not just practical but
ontological and epistemological. As Livingston (1986, 171) observes, mathe-
matical proofs are not reducible to their stable records. Arguments are en-
acted and validated through their performative unfolding—an unfolding as
absent from circulable mathematical texts as it is essential to the production
and intelligibility of their arguments. Like the proofs it conveys, blackboard
writing travels only through rewriting. Unlike the marks in books, papers,
or slides, blackboard inscriptions can only ever unfold at the pace of chalk
sliding against slate. The intrinsic necessity of bit-by-bit unfolding in math-
ematical exposition is thus built into chalk as its means of writing.
This unfolding matches the “following” mode discussed above, and ex-
tends to the audience’s listening practices. Few audience members took
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notes during the seminar. Most who did made only an occasional jotting
of a theorem or reference to pursue afterwards. But those who did take ex-
tensive notes endeavored to make a near-exact transcript of what the speaker
wrote on the board, reproducing a routine practice from their early math-
ematics coursework and training. The expectation of transcription obliges
the speaker to make the board’s text self-contained and accountable, leading
to a striking duplication of effort between writing and speech whose epitome
is the stereotypical speaker who reads his talk off the board as he writes it.
The practice of “following” thus impinges both on the global narrative of the
talk and on the textual sub-narrative confined to the speaker’s marks on the
board.
The mutability of blackboard writing, moreover, enacts a specifically Pla-
tonist ontology of mathematics. In this view, mathematical objects and sys-
tems have an independent existence that is separate from their descriptions,
and the same entity can be described in a variety of ways. On a blackboard,
lecturers frequently amend statements and definitions about these mathe-
matical entities as their specific properties and constraints are made relevant
by the exposition or by audience interrogation. On such a medium, the fact
that the once-written text does not tell the final story about a mathematical
concept allows a potentially infinite variety of descriptions simultaneously to
apply to an object or situation under consideration. Where Suchman (1990,
315) and Suchman and Trigg (1993, 160) depict the board as the medium
for making objects concrete, we would stress the board’s corresponding abil-
ity to make those concepts mutable without threatening their persistence as
Platonic entities. Thus, when a speaker returns later to add a necessary
condition to a definition or theorem-statement, it can be seen as an omission
rather than an error in the speaker’s argument—the condition can be made
to have been there all along at any such point as that anteriorized conceptual
vestment is required for the lecture to go forward.
The logic of blackboard writing governs mis-statements as well as omis-
sions. When the speaker reconsidered a statement and deemed it false, the
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offending marks could be rubbed out without incident, preserving the verac-
ity of the blackboard record. The dusty traces of the statement’s removal
cue those few taking notes by pen or pencil in the audience as to which items
have been removed so they can appropriately modify their own transcripts.
In other situations, a statement was not necessarily false but, usually after an
audience enquiry, was judged to be either misleading or beyond the scope of
the presentation. In these cases, the speaker could cross out the statement,
removing it from the accountable portion of the talk but preserving it among
the lecture’s mathematical residues.
The availability of different modes of erasure also has narrative conse-
quences. Minor corrections can be made using the side of one’s hand to erase
small areas of the board while producing an audible thud that preserves the
ongoing sequence of words and board-sounds in the speaker’s story. Larger
erasures, however, must be made with a separate instrument whose use re-
quires the interruption of such discursive sequences—a desirable effect at
the end of a planned segment of a talk and an appropriate one where the
speaker must “reset” an argument after a significant lapse. The narrative
break of clearing a board establishes a board-sequence division that holds
even when a new board is available. Before embarking on a new part of an
argument, speakers sometimes clear multiple boards to avoid having to erase
one mid-sequence. Conversely, if a narrative sequence overruns its allotted
board space the speaker sometimes squeezes the remaining text in blanks
on the current board rather than move to a new one, often at the cost of
legibility.
A final point weds the ontological, epistemological, and practical signifi-
cance of blackboards. In seminars and offices alike, blackboards are used and
experienced as places for translating complex, symbol-intensive ideas into a
manipulable, surveyable form. Figure 2 shows an office board that had been
used to work out a complicated expression from a published paper. The
board shows evidence of insertion, annotation, and erasure. At the top, the
researcher started to frame his ensuing writing by singling out the expres-
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sion from the paper he aimed to comprehend, labeling it with “To show.”
The expression of interest, the researcher realized in the midst of copying it
out, was not so far removed from the chain of reasoning used to demonstrate
it, so he moved to the center of the board and wrote (in appropriate short-
hand) the entire chain of reasoning. Here, as he described it, the challenge
was not grasping a particularly complex series of manipulations but rather
understanding a complicated array of indices as a whole.
Figure 2: A example of blackboard work from a respondent’s office (colors
digitally inverted and contrasted).
After copying what he identified as the relevant expressions from the pa-
per, the researcher proceeded to annotate it in terms of questions that would
need to be satisfied for the chain of reasoning to be valid and techniques that
could answer those questions. On the right of the expression, the researcher
attempts to understand the expression by specifying more features of the
calculation than are present in the more general form in the paper, quali-
fying this specification with the note “say.” Through this blackboard work,
a supposedly abstract datum of certified knowledge becomes a self-identical
yet pliable chalk instantiation. We were told that only in this latter form
could the researcher comprehend and hope to use that expression, and yet
that very form and all its advantages were stuck, for all practical purposes,
on the board.
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5 Proofs and Reformulations
A dominant theme in sociological accounts of laboratory sciences is the re-
markable amount of labor and machinery—in Lynch’s (1990, 182) formula-
tion, taken-for-granted “preparatory practices”—devoted to producing texts
which can materialize and stabilize unruly natural phenomena in the form of
data, plots, and other representations—what Latour (e.g. 1990) called “im-
mutable mobiles.” Mathematicians face, in a sense, the opposite problem:
the phenomena they study are not unruly enough. Mathematicians thus
spend remarkable amounts of labor to materialize their objects of study, but
with the goal of coaxing those objects to behave in some new way, rather
than to hold some stable and circulable form.
There are thus two fundamentally different kinds of mathematical texts.
There are papers and reports akin to journal articles in the natural sciences,
but there are also tentative, transitory marks that try to produce new orders
out of old ones (with a crucial stage of disorder in between). Blackboards,
we have suggested, are the iconic site of this second sort of text-making.
Like the natural phenomena scientists try to tame, blackboard writing does
not move well. On the other hand, blackboard writing seems supremely
open to annotation, adaptation, and reconfiguration. Symbols and images
can be erased, redrawn, layered, counterposed, and “worked out” on the
board’s surface. Such “immobilized mutables” form a constitutive matrix
for mathematical creativity.
This “blackboard” way of working with texts is not, therefore, limited
specifically to board writing. Asked while away from his office to describe
his work space, one interviewee began with the piles and piles of paper cover-
ing his desk (figure 3). Populating those piles are reprints of articles, teaching
notes, and, most importantly, page after page of scrap paper. The inscrip-
tions of mathematical research, while implicating blackboards, whiteboards,
computers, and other media, seem mostly to subsist in the sort of notes that
suffuse the spare sheets of paper from our respondent’s desk.
Scrap paper writing shares many characteristics with chalk writing. Both
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Figure 3: One respondent’s paper-covered desk.
rely on augmentations, annotations, and elisions as concepts are developed
through iterated inscriptions designed to disrupt the formal stability of math-
ematical objects. Such iterated efforts at proving, most of which are seen as
unsuccessful, produce a long paper trail.24 One would expect this scrap pa-
per trail, at least, to be somewhat more mobile than blackboards. Not so:
for the purposes of research, the process of writing appears to matter more
than the record it produces. Scrap paper is almost never mobilized beyond
its initial use. One respondent explained that “I don’t tend to look back very
much.” Another has a policy of saving notes until he no longer recognizes
the calculations, but confesses that he too rarely looks back at them. “I do a
lot of stuff in my head,” a third researcher recounted, and his research notes
reflected this self-conception by rarely travelling beyond the sites in which
they were produced.
Merz and Knorr Cetina (1997, 87, 93) describe mathematical work as a
process of “deconstruction,” where equations from problems are successively
transformed through a variety of techniques until they yield a new theoretical
insight. One of our subjects described the process perfectly:
I’m going to keep doing the calculations again, only now trying to
24Latour (1990, 52) identifies the production and legitimation of such cascades of in-
scriptions as a decisive puzzle for the anthropology of mathematics.
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look for terms of this form. . . . I have an ocean of terms like this,
and the problem in some sense is how do you put them together
so that they make some sense.
Consider how terms are put together in the research notes excerpted in
figure 4. This researcher’s deconstruction begins with the operator L, whose
effect on a function u is first written compactly on the left-hand side of the
equation in his notes. (The brackets identifying this expression as Lu were
added after the fact as he explained this inscription during an interview.) On
the right there appears a nearly-identical expression, with a space opened up
between the ∂j and the rest of the expression’s summand (that is, ajk(x)∂ku).
Brackets beneath the two sets of symbols identify them as members of specific
families of mathematical objects, respectively S11,0 and L
∞S11 , and the latter
identification merits a written-out speculation about a technique (“symbol
smoothing”) and a desired outcome (inversion). All the while, these textual
tokens are experienced and described as ideas. In this example:
We have some variable coefficient operator [L] that looks like the
Laplacian, and so . . . [we] split it up into a sum of pieces, I guess
a product of two things. In my case, the first product . . . is just
a derivative, and . . . the second factor, less is known about.
Figure 4: An equation from an interviewee’s research notes.
In addition to regrouping, symbols can be transformed according to math-
ematical principles and with the help of auxiliary equations and images. No-
tations and framings are often adapted to particular approaches. “There’s a
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lot of notation, and it does help to go back and forth between them,” offered
one researcher. Moving between different variables and expressions can coax
a troublesome formulation to resemble a familiar one or allow researchers to
break a problem into smaller parts. Annotations can also declare aspects of
a problem to be difficult, promising, or solved. In one particularly dramatic
example of this, an interviewee recounted how
I put that in a red box because I was very excited when I realized
that. . . . In my mind it moved us closer to completion of the
project.
As concepts are continually re-materialized, salient details are expanded
or omitted, much as they would be on the blackboard. One researcher’s notes
had the word “factor” in place of a positive constant whose particular value
was not relevant at that stage of the investigation. He expected that he might
ultimately “see sort of which ones [factors] are ones that are helping you prove
your result and which ones are the obstacles,” and could then manage the
obstacles separately. The process described by multiple respondents involved
successive attempts to develop and refine a proof, with each attempt aimed
at managing a new set of constraints after one is convinced of the proof’s
“main idea.”
One should not get the impression, however, that the only papers of sig-
nificance in a mathematician’s office are scrap papers. A large amount of
space is devoted to storing books and articles that contain mathematics in
its most stable and circulable form. These are achieved through the “writ-
ing up” process, which (in our subjects’ consensus) takes place strictly after
the genuinely creative part of mathematical research—though all admitted
that the form and often the substance of a result were liable to change sub-
stantially during or even after writing up. The work of writing up deserves a
separate study—parts of it are addressed lucidly by Rosental (2008) and Merz
and Knorr Cetina (1997). For our purposes, we would like to expand upon
the inverse phenomenon: the less-recognized reading practices that convert
“written-up” prose into a form usable in mathematical research—practices
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that might be called “reading down.”
There is a crucial difference between mathematical papers and reports of
scientific experiments. Where the latter are understood to depend on the
credible reporting of experimental outcomes, the former are seen in principle
to contain all the apparatus of their verification. That is, where scientists
must describe experiments and plot data, mathematicians are expected to
reproduce in meticulous detail each of the novel rational steps behind their
conclusions. The time and thought required to understand and verify each
such detail makes mathematical papers subject to similar issues of trust, cred-
ibility, and reproducibility as have been described for the natural sciences,
but the presentation of mathematical texts as (in principle) self-contained
means that their circulation and deployment can have a decidedly different
character.
In particular, mathematical texts present readers with two kinds of use-
able information. They establish lemmas and theorems that can be invoked
as settled relations between specific mathematical phenomena, and they
present methods and manipulations that can be used by others to estab-
lish different results. Researchers access others’ papers through preprint and
citation databases, and in smaller specialisms researchers will simply send
preprints to a regular list of colleagues. They approach their stream of avail-
able papers using successive filters to identify where the two foregoing types
of information most relevant to their research will be found. The process of
perusing a database, for instance, might start with reading the titles of arti-
cles in relevant subject areas, the abstracts of articles with relevant titles, and
so forth. The mathematicians with whom we spoke almost never read papers
in their entirety—and certainly not with the goal of total comprehension.
When information from a paper is deemed immediately relevant to an
ongoing project, it is finally read for its technical detail. Rather than attempt
to digest every claim, however, readers try to identify concepts, formulations,
and conclusions that are recognizable in the context of their own work. These
identifications begin a process of re-rendering papers’ key passages in terms
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readers hope may ultimately advance their instrumental research goals.
This process of reformulating official papers into research instruments can
span several media. A single page of one researcher’s notepad, shared dur-
ing an interview, visibly manifested a series of translations from an article
to penned equations to an email to spatial gestures and further writings.
Interviewees reported experiencing mathematical concepts in terms of for-
malisms, properties, or operations. One described an equation by placing
invisible terms in the air, one by one, in front of him. “I’ve written it down
so many times,” he explained, that he instinctively saw “the first order terms
appear here and the second order terms there.” Another used a box of tea on
his desk as an impromptu prop in explaining a source of theoretical conster-
nation from a recent effort. Different modes of mathematical cognition must
necessarily interact to produce the transformations that bring about original
proofs and theorems—transformations that would not generally be possible
within a single framework of representation. Moreover, they must interact in
a way that allows the coordination of mathematical understanding between
different researchers in a variety of settings.
This leaves mathematical ideas in a strange position. Particular and
ideosyncratic inscriptions and realizations are utterly central to the prac-
tice of mathematics. Paradoxically, mathematical inscriptions (especially on
blackboards) work in ways that specifically (and, as we have argued, mis-
leadingly) assert the opposite—that ideas somehow do not depend on the
ways in which they are mobilized. The flexibility of mathematical represen-
tations obscures the socio-material coordination necessary to move concepts
so freely from one form to another. Mathematical work rests on self-effacing
technologies of representation that seem to succeed in removing themselves
entirely from the picture at the decisive junctures of mathematical under-
standing. It is only by virtue of these disappearing media that one can be
said to understand a concept itself rather than its particular manifestation.
Except when one cannot. Like scientific instruments, mathematical rep-
resentations are subject to “troubles,” flaws, and shortcomings (see Lynch
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1985). The vast majority of attempts to use material proxies in one form or
another to elucidate a concept are not counted as successes within a program
of research. Seminars are among the rare displays of mathematical semiosis
in a research setting where it is understood and expected that the signs will
work. Mathematical research is marked by the constant struggle to create
viable signs. As one of our subjects put it:
It’s largely having a model and trying to get the new thing to fit
into the old model, and at certain points that simply fails, and
at that point you sort of mess around and think about . . . the
old one a slightly different way, sometimes just calculating [and]
seeing what comes out . . . .
6 Representation in Mathematical Practice
In most people’s experience, mathematics is a static body of knowledge con-
sisting of concepts and techniques that are the same now as they were when
they were developed hundreds or thousands of years ago and are the same ev-
erywhere for their users and non-users alike. Little would suggest that there
are corners of mathematics that are changing all the time, where as-yet un-
thinkable entities interact in a primordial soup of practices that constantly
struggle to assert their intelligibility. Such is the realm and such are the
objects of mathematical research.
The relationship between mathematicians and their objects of study is
anything but straightforward. There is no mathematical concept whose for-
mal immediacy or self-evidence stands beyond media and mediation. As a
science of ideals, mathematics rests on the capacity of mathematicians to
legitimize and manipulate particular representations of mathematical phe-
nomena in order to elucidate rigorous mathematical knowledge.
In contrast to well-worn accounts of representation in the natural sciences,
the story of mathematics is less about the hidden work of taming a natural
phenomenon according to ideals than about the very public work of crafting
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those putatively independent ideals from their always-already-dispensable
material manifestations. We have proposed chalk as both a literal and a
figurative embodiment of that work. As a physical means of representation,
chalk and blackboards entail a potent but highly circumscribed means of
publicly materializing mathematical concepts. Their mode of representation,
moreover, defines and influences mathematical practices far beyond those
relatively limited circumstances where the mathematician actually has chalk
in hand.
Mathematical writing and the mathematical thinking that goes with it
are markedly dependent on the media available to the mathematician. Math-
ematical work traces the contours of its surfaces—there is little that is think-
able in mathematics that need not also be writeable, particularly in the
mathematics that is shared between mathematicians.25 Blackboards, paper,
and other media make certain forms of writing, and hence certain kinds of
arguments and approaches, more feasible than others. Without having to as-
sert that the limits on mathematical inscription definitively foreclose many
potential truths from ever being described and accepted mathematically, it
is manifestly clear that those limits can and do imply corresponding con-
straints on the lived and daily course of mathematical research. As De Millo,
Lipton, and Perlis (1979, 274–275) put it, “. . . propositions that require five
blackboards or a roll of paper towels to sketch—these are unlikely ever to be
assimilated into the body of mathematics.”
Even when a viable constellation of representations is found, the mathe-
matician’s work is not done. These multifarious semiotic entities must then
be made accountable to the equations, syllogisms, and arguments found in
the published literature that compose the official corpus of mathematical
knowledge—a project for which they are poorly adapted. A staggering por-
tion of mathematicians’ work goes into decoding published papers to cre-
ate functional intuitions and understandings and, conversely, into encoding
25Rotman (1993, x ) likewise asserts an interweaving of thought and inscription, though
his focus is on the semiotics of mathematical abstractions rather than the paticularities of
mathematical research and communication.
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those intuitions in the accountable forms in which they will be credited as
genuine. This is why chalk and seminars are so important. They give re-
searchers shared partial access to what is so obviously missing from official
accounts of completed work: namely, the experienced material performance
of mathematics in action. The tension between circulation and application
in mathematics is a real one. Mathematical ideas are not pre-given as the
universal entities they typically appear to be. The most important features
of mathematics can be as ephemeral as dust on a blackboard.
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